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This thesis assesses the methodology and input sensitivity
of the Method of Screening Operational Concepts of Warfare
(MOSCOW) model. This assessment illuminates the fundamental
assumptions underlying the model's methodology and evaluates
the model's sensitivity to small percentage changes of inputs.
Results provide an estimate of MOSCOW'S limitations,
suggesting which parts of the model may need to be improved.
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THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed
in this research may not have been exercised for all cases of
interest. While every effort has been made, within the time
available, to ensure that the programs are free of
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered
validated. Any application of these programs without
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research conducted by the RAND Corporation for the
U.S. Army has resulted in the development of a new low
resolution land combat model. This model, Method of Screening
Operational Concepts of Warfare (MOSCOW) , is designed to allow
users to evaluate the differences between various war fighting
concepts. Briefly stated, this model uses a Lanchesterian
square law formulation to compute the quantity of Blue force
resources required to secure a specified attrition of Red
forces in a given combat scenario. The central features of
the model are described in RAND report R-3643-A, A New
Approach for the Design and Evaluation of Land Defense
Concepts . This report provides a brief explanation of the
model's general methodology and how such a model can be used
to aid in war fighting concept analysis.
The traditional aim of land combat modeling is to answer
the question, "Who will win the Battle?" The approach used
to answer this question usually combines knowledge of a
battle's initial conditions (force levels, doctrine, weapons'
characteristics)
, the attrition relationships between weapons,
and, for each side, the set of conditions or condition that
constitutes losing. The Vector-In-Commander model, currently
the Army's primary modeling tool to address force analysis
issues, uses this approach. MOSCOW, by contrast, attempts to
answer the question, "How much friendly force is needed to
win?" To accomplish this, MOSCOW combines information about
a specific scenario with a description of the combat
capabilities of an individual friendly combat unit. Scenario
information includes the size, organization, and weapons
characteristics of the opposing force, effects of the
environment and terrain, and the attrition relationships
between enemy and friendly weapons. Friendly forces are
described only in terms of an "average" combat unit. Such
units are typically one or two echelons smaller than the total
size of the opposing force. MOSCOW uses this information to
determine the number of such friendly units required to
destroy a sufficient quantity of the opposing force to produce
victory. Victory is defined as the amount of attrition which
friendly forces must impose on the enemy.
In its current version, MOSCOW has several desirable
features. First, it is implemented as a LOTUS 1-2-3
spreadsheet. Entering or modifying any of the approximately
3 50 input parameters, running the program, or capturing the
results of model runs requires a personal computer and a
minimum of experience with LOTUS. Model run time is on the
order of seconds. Most favorable, however, is the intuitive
appeal of the model's output which simply lists the amount of
resources needed for the friendly, or Blue, force to
accomplish its tactical objective. The advantage of this
approach is that it allows for simple comparisons between
different sets of model inputs. Where one set of inputs may,
for example, require nine friendly units to achieve victory,
another set may require ten. Thus, MOSCOW'S outputs can be
easily ranked, allowing the most favorable (e.g., those
requiring the fewest resources) to be immediately identified.
An example of the output screen produced by the current
version of MOSCOW is shown in Table 1. This example was
TABLE 1
Output Display Screen from MOSCOW
BLUE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS
AMT MAX AFFORD- REQD/
CATEGORY RESOURCE REQD AVAIL. ABLE? AVAIL
TOTAL MVR STANDING 35.1 mvrs 21.8 *N0* 161%
NEEDED ST. + REPL 39.1 mvr+eqvs 30.4 *N0* 129%
TOTAL 48636 pers 250000 YES 19%
CASUALTIES AVG/DAY: 5>o 19384 pers/day 5000 *N0* 388%
PEAK/DAY/MVR 35.7% of mvr 15.0% *N0* 238%
REPL (def;
I
MMVR-EQVS MAX REPL 4.0 mvr-eqvs 8.6 YES 47%
NEEDED REPL/DAY 1.60 mvr-eq/d 0.29 *N0* 561%
(MIN= 2.4 ) YES
REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL 23923 pers 200000 YES 12%
STOCKS NEEDED VEHICLES 5630 veh 12000 YES 47%
1.4E+05 AMMO 9.5E+04 tons 7.0E+05 YES 14%
(Red Ammo) POL 4.3E+04 tons 5.0E+06 YES 1%
OTHER 1.1E+04 tons 1.0E+05 YES 11%
LIFT 3.8E+05 tons 1.5E+06 YES 25%
RESOURCE AMT REQD AMT AV AFFRDBL? REQ/AV
AVERAGE DAILY PERSONNEL 9534.5 pers/d 4000.0 *N0* 238%
REPLACEMENTS VEHICLES 2243.9 veh/d 400.0 *N0* 561%
5.5E+04 AMMO 3.8E+04 tons/d 2.0E+04 *N0* 189%
(Red ammo) POL 1.7E+04 tons/d 4.0E+05 YES 4%
NEEDED OTHER 4.5E+03 tons/d 4.0E+03 *N0* 111%
LIFT 1.5E+05 tons/d 1.1E+04 *N0* 1379%
SUPPLY & HQs #S VEHS 2.1E+05 # vehs 1.0E+05 *N0* 208%





DELAY 1.96 days 3.00 *N0* 153%
produced by inputs representing the defense of Europe. 1 In
this situation, friendly units are measured in terms of
divisions (approx. 1400 combat vehicles) and the success
objective is defined as the destruction of 80% attacking enemy
divisions (each enemy division contains approximately 1100
combat vehicles) . Note that this output is divided into three
parts. The first part reports the total friendly force
requirements needed to achieve success. The second part
summarizes total logistic and personnel cost. The last
section is a report of the average daily logistic and
personnel cost. The "delay" output measures the additional
time enemy forces will need to achieve a specified penetration
into friendly territory due to combat with friendly units.
This penetration limit may be seen as the enemy force
objective. In this example, the penetration limit is 30
kilometers. An explanation of the many abbreviations used in
Table 1 is in Appendix A.
Although this type of output substantially eliminates the
need for data reduction or post-processing common to other
higher resolution models 2 which rely on killer-victim score
boards, sensitivity analysis requires multiple model runs.
1 Table 1 shows an output screen for inputs proposed by
Romero [Ref. 1] which depict a scenario for the defense of
Europe using MOSCOW version MO031188. This paper investigates
the performance of this version of MOSCOW.
2 The Vector-In-Commander (VIC) model stands in stark
contrast to MOSCOW in this regard.
This is required since MOSCOW'S output is the result of
completely deterministic calculations. The current version
contains one method of recording the results of such
experiments for later comparisons.
A. OBJECTIVE
The central aim of this paper is to provide an assessment
of MOSCOW for use as a low resolution land combat model. This
assessment is based both on an analysis of the general
methodology used in MOSCOW and the results of experiments.
These experiments explore model sensitivity by examining the
difference in MOE • s produced by various inputs. Results focus
on MOSCOW'S limitations and possible improvements.
B. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS
This analysis has two distinct parts. The first part is
an investigation of MOSCOW'S modeling methodology. This
investigation indicates the circumstances in which underlying
methodology may be incompatible with a potential combat
scenario. The second part explores the sensitivity of the
model to changes in a subset of fundamental input parameters.
This exploration illuminates where the natural variability of
inputs may produce instability or unexpected results. Such
relationships are a point of concern in any model verification
effort. These sensitivity experiments provide an initial look
at model verification by illuminating obvious modeling errors.
II. OVERVIEW OF MOSCOW'S METHODOLOGY
MOSCOW is a computationally complex model which ultimately
represents a real battlefield by a series of simple battles
between appropriate numbers of two different combat systems
or forces. Consider a real world conflict between two sides,
Red and Blue, where each combatant uses a large number of
different types of direct and indirect fire systems. The
first step in using MOSCOW is to quantitatively arrive at a
set of input values which express not only the average
lethality, mobility, vulnerability, and logistical attributes
for both Red and Blue forces, but also incorporates the
effects of morale, doctrine, terrain, and the synergism which
may exist between weapons systems. This step is not trivial.
Training and Doctrine Analysis Command, Ft. Leavenworth draft
technical report, A Methodology for Estimating MOSCOW Inputs ,
proposes one method using harmonic averaging of weapon system
and force characteristics to compute input value estimates .
Appendix B gives a brief description of the various types of
inputs and lists two sets of unclassified inputs generated
using this procedure. While this reference gives a complete
description of specific inputs, the central feature of MOSCOW
3 This report also discusses assumptions implicit to the
input estimation process and provides two unclassified sets
of inputs which depict a US Corps employing airland battle
doctrine in both attack and defend scenarios on NORTHAG
terrain.
is the simplicity of the methodology used to construct an
attrition model. This model incorporates the contributions
of direct fire weapons, indirect fire support means, and
attacking aircraft (including helicopters and fixed wing)
.
A. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS IN MOSCOW
One important result of the input estimation process is
the formulation of "average" combat vehicle attributes for
Red and Blue. These values represent an abstraction from
reality, expressing the operational attributes expected from
a myriad of real weapon systems in a single vehicle. Another
important result of input estimation is the aggregation of
direct and indirect fire attributes of maximum range, rate of
fire, and lethality. This is important since these quantities
define the rate of attrition a force is able to inflict on its
opponent during battle. Although the combination of both
direct and indirect fire components in an attrition model can
be modeled using a heterogeneous system of differential
equations [Ref. 2], MOSCOW uses the following assumptions
that:
1. The rate at which targets are susceptible to attack
by indirect fire systems is constant throughout the
battle.
2. For each side, the proportion of direct and indirect
fire systems as a fraction of the total force remains
constant throughout the battle.
These assumptions reduce a complex heterogeneous formulation
to the simpler square law case 4 . The viability of these
assumptions is not addressed in the existing description of
MOSCOW'S methodology 5 .
The simplification to a square law formulation has the
advantage of an explicit solution [Ref. 2]. An alternative
method would be to use a Helmbold formulation [Ref. 3] of the
form:
dx/dt = - a (x/y) 1 "* y (1)
dy/dt = - b (y/x) 1 "" x (2)
This method would require a numeric solution and
necessitate a significant programming effort to implement in
the current version of MOSCOW . Its advantage, however, is
that the relationship between the direct and indirect portions
4 Mathematical details of how this simplification works
are in Appendix C.
' In fact, these assumptions are not directly discussed.
Limitations suggested by Romero (section 4.2.1) indicate that
MOSCOW is suited only to those situations where a sufficiently
large number of units (at least 3-5) are in combat long
enough to establish a relatively constant tempo of combat
activities.
6 Recoding would be required to replace closed form
solutions of the square law formulation with a subprogram
which calculates a numerical approximation. Since such
methods typically require iterative calculation, incorporating
this change in the current version of MOSCOW will be difficult
because MOSCOW already requires a separate iterative procedure




of the battle can be examined directly by varying the
parameter, w, which is an exponential scaling parameter. One
way to obtain values for the attrition rate coefficients, a
and b, is to aggregate the results of higher resolution
models. In any event, setting w = 1 reduces the formulation
to the square law case while w = 1/2 approximates the linear
law case. However, Taylor, [Ref. 4] shows that estimating
this exponential parameter is difficult for any given
scenario. MOSCOW currently claims to provide a similar
capability based on an exponential change in the form of the
time dependent solution to the square law formulation [Ref.
1] . As shown in Appendix D, this change produces an attrition
relationship which is not equivalent to the square law case.
Not explained further by Romero, it is apparently a heuristic
technique which can be used to change the pace of attrition.
B. ACTIVITY CYCLE CONSTRUCTION
MOSCOW uses an activity cycle concept to describe the
various related activities of Red and Blue forces. As
expected, these activities are not symmetric between attacker
and defender. Table 2 lists the fifteen activities used in
the current version of MOSCOW.
TABLE 2. List of MOSCOW Activity Cycle Events
Defend Activities Attack Activities Common Activities
Prepare defenses Move to wpn range Survey and Reconnoiter
Defend Attack (Initial) Delay for orders
Attack (Reinforced) Disengage
Reclose Reconstitute




Move to standby position
A potential criticism of this methodology is that it is
ill suited to describe the combat processes of large
organizations (corps/division) which are doctrinally committed
to continuous combat operations. MOSCOW eliminates this
problem by defining activity cycles in terms of the time an
individual combat system can expect to spend in each activity
event. This avoids the problem of trying to define the length
of a division's attack event, or, with even greater absurdity,
trying to decide on the distance an entire division must
artificially travel to resupply even though such supplies are
doctrinally brought forward to units in contact with the
enemy.
C. AIR SUPPORT
MOSCOW uses a simple method to describe air support in a
land combat scenario. This method avoids the use of a
Lanchester type formulation by assuming that the attrition
rate per sortie is constant. The total number of sorties
flown is computed directly from user supplied inputs of the
10
total number of aircraft available, attrition rate per sortie,
and the sortie rate . Vehicle attrition which results from
close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI) is assumed
to be proportional to the total number of sorties flown.
To eliminate difficulties in linking the air and ground
portions of the model, the initial numbers of Red and Blue
ground combat systems are lowered by the attrition effects of
air attacks during the entire battle8 . Using these revised
force levels, the attrition produced by ground combat is
calculated using the square law relationships previously
discussed. While this partition of attrition calculations
obviously limits MOSCOW'S capacity to model many possible
methods of employing air support, the model provides a certain
flexibility in that support can be partitioned between CAS and
AI with further allocations to vehicle attrition, imposing
delay, or disruption of enemy command, control, and
communication capabilities.
D. HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY
Although MOSCOW aggregates the effects of indirect fire
systems into the direct fire battle by using the simplifying
assumption detailed in Appendix C, the model attempts to
account for counterbattery fire, artillery attacks on enemy
7 See Appendix E
This methodology avoids the timing problems which can
result from the linkage of air and ground battle models
[Ref. 5].
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command and control installations, and long range attacks on
troop concentrations. This is accomplished by assuming a
specified amount of destruction or disruption is inflicted for
every ton of ammunition fired by "headquarters artillery".
These units represent those which provide indirect fire
support to the battle but are not subject to the battle
attrition. Attrition effects, as in the case of those caused
by air attacks, are subtracted from initial force levels used
in the subsequent Lanchester ground attrition calculations.
Disruption of command and control is accomplished by
increasing factors which result in lengthening a unit's "delay
for orders" activity event and thus slowing the pace of the
battle.
As a consequence of this methodology, the real combat
systems represented by "Headquarters artillery9 " do not enter
into any attrition calculations. This is a result of the
square law simplification which leaves no possibility of
explicitly partitioning indirect fires between attacks on
enemy headquarters, fire support means, or maneuver forces.
Because of this methodology, the sets of inputs listed in
Appendix B which refer to "Headquarters artillery" are set to
zero, thus removing this class of inputs from the model.
9 Romero suggests multiple rocket launcher systems can
be described in this way. [Ref. 1, sec A-1.7]
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E. SIMULTANEITY
MOSCOW is essentially a system of simultaneous equations
which, when solved iteratively, converge to a solution. The
need for iterative calculations stems inherently from the
model's structure in three ways 10 . First, combat is initiated
when enough combat power on each side is massed to achieve an
engagement threshold determined by the force ratio
requirements of both Red and Blue. The time needed to mass
this combat power is assumed to be inversely proportional to
the density of the respective forces. Since the density of
the Blue force is a function of the model's output, the model
is self referential. Additionally, since an increase in the
number of Blue units results in a proportional increase in
force density, which in turn decreases the time required to
mass sufficient Blue forces, the result is a subsequent
decrease in the number of Blue units required. Thus, the
system converges. The same type of relationship holds for
combat activities which delay attacking units.
Combat events, such as air attacks directed against an
attacking force, typically delay an attacker's advance. The
amount of delay imposed on an attacker in a given time period
tends to decrease as the defending force is attrited. But any
event which serves to increase the duration of the battle
will, necessarily, allow more time for the defender to be
10 See Romero sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.4
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attrited, resulting in a decrease of the battle's duration.
Thus, this system must converge to a point which balances the
overall battle duration and force levels.
Lastly, MOSCOW'S definition of tactical mobility
establishes the "average" engagement distance which scales
the lethality coefficients used to compute attrition. As the
duration of an engagement increases, the closure of forces
results in a decrease in the average engagement distance with
the result that lethality is increased. Hence, the length of
the battle decreases. This system must also converge as in
the previous cases.
The important consequence of simultaneity is that model
output is made more accurate by increasing the number of
recalculations performed on a given set of inputs. The number
of recalculations for any given level of accuracy must be
established by experiment 11 .
n Romero suggest 12 - 15 iterations are sufficient.
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III. ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
MOSCOW'S methodology limits its suitability to accurately
represent certain combat scenarios.
A. ANNIHILATION OF FORCES CANNOT BE APPROACHED
Stochastic models which attempt to account for randomness
in combat are known to produce results which differ from
otherwise equivalent deterministic modeling formulations .
These differences appear in square law attrition processes
when two side have approximate parity (equality terms of
numbers and lethality) or when one side approaches a point of
annihilation. In the first case, parity of forces will result
in MOSCOW'S underestimating the length of a battle
[Ref. 2]. Although this parity is unlikely in attack
scenarios (logically, rational doctrine precludes attack with
little hope of victory) , it is possible, perhaps common, in
the defense 1 . In MOSCOW, however, any discrepancy between
deterministic and stochastic results should be minimized
because actual battle attrition occurs in only a small
12 See Hartman, sec F.6
Historical examples from World War I suffice to make
this point.
15
fraction of the total campaign length. 14 Thus, this case is
of little concern.
In the second case, where one side is annihilated, Hartman
[Ref 2, sec F-6] demonstrates that a deterministic square law
model will overestimate the winning force size while
underestimating the size of the losing force. Furthermore,
an annihilation condition would violate an assumption of
constant "area fire" target availability 15 . Because this
limitation is fundamental to it's underlying formulation,
MOSCOW should not be used in such circumstances. The point
where annihilation effects become serious, however, is
unknown. This is an area for further research.
B. MINIMAL LINKAGE OF AIR-GROUND BATTLE
Because attrition of ground forces produced by air attacks
is only a function of the total number of sorties, MOSCOW
cannot directly account for any synergism between air and
ground forces. Within a given number of sorties, only
questions concerning allocation between close air support and
air interdiction missions can be addressed. If the question
to be answered involves trying to determine the "best"
14 See Romero, Appendix B, Sec 2. Romero observes that,
historically, units spend proportionally little time engaged
in actual combat.
15 See Appendix B.
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allocation, MOSCOW is ill suited to provide answers since it
has no mechanism for optimization 16 .
C. CONSTANT PROPORTION OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE SYSTEMS
As shown in Appendix C, the reduction of a complex
attrition processes between direct and indirect fire systems
requires the simplifying assumption that such attrition leaves
the proportion of direct and indirect fire systems constant
throughout the battle. The limitation this assumption places
on the use of MOSCOW is unknown. The possibility exists,
however, that a battle process which results in wide variation
of this proportion will not be accurately modeled in some
instances. This is another topic for further investigation.
16 See Romero Sec IV.
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IV. ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING MODEL PERFORMANCE
In order to assess the performance of the current version
of MOSCOW, the sensitivities exhibited by the model to changes
in various inputs were calculated from the results of
factorial experiments. These results were examined using two
criteria: the magnitude of change the variation of an input
produces in specific measures of effectiveness, and whether
or not the direction of the resulting change agrees with
intuition. Although the interpretation of these results does
not represent a formal verification of MOSCOW, it does
illuminate which portions of the model seem to perform
according to expectation and which areas may contain obvious
errors.
A. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
This analysis relies on an assumption that a suitable low
resolution land combat model will exhibit one basic
characteristic. This characteristic is that, all other
things being equal 17
,
a small change in one force attribute
or scenario circumstance will produce a correspondingly small
change in the amount of force attrition which results from
combat. This assumption is reasonable in that it agrees with
17 This is essentially the situation in MOSCOW, where the
process of input estimation effectively fixes the tactics and
organizations of the combatants.
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intuition. Suppose, for example, that the lethality of direct
fire weapons increases by a small increment because of a
technological improvement. With no change in tactics, a
tremendous increase in combat capability would be unexpected.
It would be far more likely to observe some incremental
improvement in combat effectiveness, making the opposing force
a "little" easier to kill. A similar argument can be made for
an incremental decrease of a force attribute. As applied to
MOSCOW, this reasoning suggests that small changes in input
variables should produce correspondingly small changes in the
number of Blue forces needed to attain a specified attrition
of Red.
This reasoning implies a general measure of MOSCOW'S
overall suitability is to assess its sensitivity to small
changes in inputs. This approach requires quantitative
definitions be assigned to the terms "sensitivity" and "small
changes". To this end, a small input change is defined 18 as
one which does not alter the level of the input by more than
10%. Similarly, a model output measure of effectiveness is
considered "sensitive" with respect to a specific input
variable if changing the level of the input by a given
proportion produces a change in output of equal or greater
This definition is not purely ad hoc. It is
consistent with current U.S. Army readiness classifications
which consider a unit "fully mission capable" if it possesses
90% or more of its authorized strength in personnel and
equipment.
19
proportion. For example, if a 10% change in an input results
in a 10% or greater change of an output, the output measure
is "sensitive" to the input variable at the 10% level.
A further possibility is that the effects of varying two
or more inputs may interact in combination to change the
levels of output measures of effectiveness. If inputs are
varied in the same proportion, a reasonable definition of
sensitivity is to call an output "sensitive" to the
interaction of inputs if the magnitude of the resulting change
is equal to or greater than the proportional changes in the
inputs which produced the interaction 19 . Thus, if two inputs
are varied by 10% and the resulting interactions produce a
change in output which is egual to or greater than 10%, the
output is considered "sensitive" to the interaction of these
inputs at the 10% level.
B. FACTORIAL EXPERIMENT DESIGN
One well known technique which examines the effects of
varying two or more inputs is to use experiments with a
factorial design. These methods are well understood and
easily applied to experiments with MOSCOW because, as a
completely deterministic model, questions concerning the
experimental significance of effects are irrelevant due to the
fact that multiple model runs using identical inputs will
19 This definition agrees with the way levels of
interaction are computed in factorial experiments. See
Davies, section 7.33.
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produce identical results. Thus, the natural variation of
experimental results, common to "real world" or stochastic
processes, never occurs and analysis of variance cannot be
performed. The use of a factorial design with this
simplification reduces to a procedure for calculating the main
effects of input variables and their associated interactions.
Of all possible designs for factorial experiments, the
simplest way to compute both main effects and interactions of
inputs is using a 2 n factorial design [Ref. 6:pp. 257]. This
method examines the effects of varying n inputs. Each input
takes one of two values: a lower, or base level, and a higher
level. By examining the effects of all possible combinations
of input levels, the main effect of each input can be
calculated by finding the difference between the average model
output when an input is held at a high level and the average
observed at lower input levels. For two different inputs, A
and B, the interactions between A and B can be measured by
computing the difference in the effect of A when B is at a
higher level, and the effect of A when B is at a lower level 20 .
Details of this method are in Appendix F.
C. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF 2 n FACTORIAL DESIGN
As shown by Davies [Ref. 6, sec 7.27], the principle
advantage of a factorial design is maximum efficiency when
compared to other methods. Complete factorial experiments
20 See Davies, Section 7-44, p. 259-260
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such as a 2 n design are free from the confounding of
interactions found in partial designs. The fundamental
limitation imposed by a 2 n design is that it involves
performing a number of experiments which rises exponentially
with the number of variables. Additionally, the algorithm
used to compute main effects and interactions has complexity
0(2 n ) . In a practical sense, this complexity means that
computation time and computer memory requirements increase by
a factor of 2 n as the number of inputs increase. This fact
limits the number of variables which can be considered in such
an experiment using the model's current LOTUS format and a Z-
248 computer to about ten input variables 21 .
D. GROUPING OF INPUTS FOR EXPERIMENTATION
The two sets of inputs found in Appendix B represent two
completely different scenarios which use different scales of
resolution. The Attack scenario is fought with
Brigade/Regiment sized units (approx 300 vehicles per unit)
while the Defense scenario is an engagement between Divisions
(approximately 1000 vehicle per unit) . To see if the
sensitivity of MOSCOW'S inputs appears to be relatively
consistent across these two scenarios and two scales, 12
factorial experiments were performed on each scenario using
corresponding inputs. To meet the limitation of no more than
Using MOSCOW'S LOTUS programming format, a 2 10
experiment requires approximately 18 hours of computing time
with a Zenith 248 series personal computer.
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ten input variables per experiment, input groups were chosen
in an ad hoc attempt to find large interactions. For each
scenario, experiments were generally partitioned between Red
and Blue with separate experiments on groups of logically
related input variables such as weapon attributes,
logistic/maintenance constraints, battle scaling inputs, unit
description, and inputs related to activity cycle
construction. Additionally, one experiment dealt with what
appear to be critical scenario variables such a the length of
time each day usable for combat and the number of Red units
allowed to survive. This last input defines the Blue force
success criteria. A complete listing of input variables used
in each experiment is in Appendix G.
E. SELECTION OF MODEL OUTPUTS USED IN VARIABLE COMPARISON
The question of which model outputs are the "best" to use
as a means of evaluating the effects of changes in model
inputs is difficult because existing documentation is silent
on this issue. For the lack of a better method, it seems
reasonable to use outputs which most directly result from
MOSCOW'S underlying attrition and activity cycle algorithms
because the inherent sensitivity of these algorithms is the
issue which bears on the model's overall suitability. Outputs
which are a direct measure of Blue's force requirements
clearly meet this criteria. In MOSCOW, this total force
requirement number is expressed as the sum of two values: the
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number of Blue units required at the start of combat, and the
number of Blue units required as reinforcements22 . Since
these two outputs are obviously basic to the model's purpose,
their selection is a logical choice. Two other outputs from
MOSCOW'S supplementary calculations also meet this criteria
since they are a direct measure of activity cycle
calculations. These outputs measure the number of Attack and
Defend cycles Blue forces are able to successfully execute
during a battle. Lastly, one of MOSCOW'S supplementary
outputs gives the ratio of Red to Blue forces required to meet
Blue victory conditions. Since such ratios are a commonly
used measure of force effectiveness, this output was selected
because of its familiarity23 .
Each of these five outputs are direct results of attrition
and activity cycle calculations. Other outputs, notably those
dealing with personnel, fuel, and ammunition requirements, are
22 Romero refers to initial Blue force requirements as
"standing" Blue units while follow on forces are called
"replacements"
23 This familiarity is expressed in two ways. First,
force ratio attrition models use the ratio of fire power
indices as a measure of the relative combat power in a battle
(see Hartman, Chapter 4) . Although MOSCOW does not use this
technique, such a ratio measure is part of folklore from
earlier ATLAS and IDAGAM models. The concern with force ratio
in terms of numbers of weapons is also a common measure used
by Soldiers to assess the relative strength of forces in a
battle. This is the interpretation used in MOSCOW.
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not computed by attrition calculations 24 . As such, none of
these outputs were used in sensitivity experiments. However,
as more information about MOSCOW'S algorithms becomes
available, some of these outputs may prove to be better
measures of input sensitivity than those chosen for this
investigation
.
F. MODEL ITERATION REQUIREMENTS
A consequence of the simultaneity inherent to MOSCOW is
that successive spreadsheet recalculations (model iterations)
produce a convergence of model outputs to unique values which
are a function of the inputs. The practical problem the user
faces is to determine how many recalculations are sufficient
to produce "adequate" convergence. By adequate is meant the
convergence necessary to produce results with a level of
accuracy specified by the model user.
For the investigation of input sensitivity, the minimum
number of recalculations sufficient for convergence were found
experimentally for both Attack and Defend scenarios. Adequate
convergence was defined as the number of recalculations beyond
which any additional recalculation will change the number of
"Standing" Blue units required by less than half of one Blue
combat vehicle. This definition of adequate convergence is
sufficient to insure model resolution to the level of an
The model developer, Phil Romero, confirmed this
interpretation of the secondary nature of logistic
requirements calculations during discussions on 15 April 1988.
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individual Blue combat vehicle. While this resolution may be
excessive, especially for battles involving hundreds of combat
vehicles, it is the highest level of resolution which makes
any practical sense25 . Appendix H contains a description of
the experimental procedure used to find the iteration
requirements for both scenarios. The results of these
experiments suggest that 21 recalculations will produce
adequate convergence in the Attack scenario while the Defense
scenario needs only 15 recalculations.
G. IMPLEMENTATION OF A 2 n FACTORIAL EXPERIMENT WITHIN MOSCOW
Programming factorial experiments within MOSCOW'S LOTUS
spreadsheet format was done using LOTUS macro commands. The
code implementing a 2 n experiment was imbedded in a
sufficiently large range of empty cells. This program
addition contains three main sections. The first section
computes the difference between an experimental variable's
upper and lower levels. The second section consists of a
series of nested loops which insure the levels of desired
inputs are varied to produce all input level combinations
specified by the factorial design. This section also writes
a table of results which records the level of each
experimental variable and the corresponding value of the five
outputs for each experimental trial. The last section writes
25 Since the size of a Blue unit is naturally expressed
as a whole numbers of combat vehicles, resolution in model
outputs beyond one vehicle makes no sense.
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the results table to an output file for later analysis.
Details of this macro coding are in Appendix I.
The computation of main effects and interactions was done
by first converting the tabular results produced by factorial
experiment macros from LOTUS spreadsheet format to one which
could be read directly by an APL*PLUS interpreter. This was
accomplished using the file conversion facilities within the
STATGRAPHICS statistical software package. Main effects and
interactions were computed using an interactive APL function
which implements the algorithm in Appendix F. A listing of
this function is in Appendix J.
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V. RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY EXPERIMENTS
A. MAGNITUDE OF MODEL INPUT SENSITIVITY
The interpretation of the magnitude of both main effects
and interactions relies on the observation that if interaction
terms are "large", then the corresponding main effects of the
inputs which produce the interaction do not have much meaning
[Ref. 6, sec 7.34]. This is a practical result of the
observation that if a combination of inputs is responsible for
a large effect, then the degree to which a change of one input
produces a change of model output must depend heavily on the
levels of other inputs. Conversely, if interactions are
small, then the effects produced by different inputs must be
essentially independent. This relationship yields a procedure
for analyzing the results of a factorial experiment which is
to compare the magnitude of interactions with the
corresponding main effects, determining whether or not the
effects of the inputs are independent. Having found the
independent main effects and dominating interactions, the
inputs which produce these results can then be examined on the
basis of intuition about expected model performance.
Table 3 contains the significant interactions found for
all factorial experiments; that is, the interactions where a
10% change in inputs produces a 10% or greater change in model





EXPERIMENT: Red Maneuver Unit Description and Operational Policy
Interacting Inputs
#RED VEHICLES/RED UNIT
C ERROR BY ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE
DESIRED ATTACKING FORCE RATIO
%FIRERS-DIRECT FIRE
DESIRED ATTACKING FORCE RATIO
C ERROR BY ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE
%EIRERS-DIRECT FIRE
C
3ERROR BY ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE
DESIRED ATTACKING FORCE RATIO
%FIRERS-DIRECT FIRE
C ERROR BY ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Model Output Levels










.332 .065 .331 .019 .192
SCENARIO: ATTACK







STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
-1.286 -.659 -.258
.332 .065 .331 .019 .192
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of the standing Blue units (STAND) and replacement Blue units
required (REPL) . These values express the numbers of Blue
brigades in the Attack scenario and Blue divisions in the
Defense scenario required to meet victory conditions. The
output which reports the change in the ratio of the overall
number of forces (R:B) has no units, while the change in the
number of Blue attack (ATK) and defense (DEF) activity cycles
corresponds to operations at the brigade level in the Attack
scenario and division level in the Defense scenario. Of the
approximately 10,000 interactions examined in 24 factorial
experiments, only six inputs combine to produce large
interactions.
Comparing these interactions with the corresponding table
of large main effects in Table 4, it is immediately apparent
that interactions involving the input representing the amount
of command and control errors induced on Red forces by Blue
electronic warfare (EW) efforts has no effect on any
significantly large interactions. Large pairwise interactions
with this input equal the main effect of the paired input.
For example, the interaction of the inputs Desired Red
Attacking Force Ratio and Red C3 Error by Blue Electronic
Warfare produces a R:B (force ratio) interaction of -.565 in
the defense scenario. This is exactly equal to the main
effect of the Desired Red Attacking Force Ratio on the R:B
output MOE. Thus, with the exception of the interaction of
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TABLE 4
Significant Input Main Effects
Input
HRS/DAY USABLE
# RED ENGINEER UNITS
RED PENETRATION LIMIT
# BLUE ENGINEER UNITS
# RED VEH/RED UNIT




ERROR BY BLUE EU
# BLUE VEH/ BLUE UNIT
BLUE ATK FORCE RATIO
MISC LETHALITY (Red atk)
HISC VULN (Blue def)
COEF BLUE ENG ABILITY
COEF RED ENG ABILITY
BLUE DIRECT FIRE RATE
BLUE SIDE ARMOR COEF
MAX CUM RED UNIT ATTRITION
RED TIME STATIONARY IN ATK
%ATK ENGMENT END BY BLUE







R:B ATK DEF STAND
Defense Scenario
REPL R:B ATK DEF
1.14* .313 .358 .234
1.286 .659 .258
-.227 -.463 -.276
-1.861 -.950 -.376 -1.616 -.056 .248 -.065 -.965
1.332 .252 - .264 .651 .300 .095 -.444 .029

























1.137 .113 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192
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Desired Red Attacking Force Ration and Red %Firers Direct
Fire, all significant interactions in the Defense scenario
reduce to main effects. The one remaining interacting is only
barely significant in the output MOE R:B.
The interaction of the inputs which represent the number
of Blue and Red engineer units in the attack scenario follows
the same pattern. Comparing this interaction with the
corresponding main effects reveals that the combined effect
of these inputs appears to depend only on the level of Red
engineer units with the unexpected result that the change
produced by the interaction of Red and Blue engineers is
exactly equal to the negative of the main effect for the
number of Red engineers26 . This result is completely
unexpected since the obvious relationship is that Red engineer
units tend to negate the efforts of Blue engineers and visa
versa. Thus the expected result is surly that the interaction
of these two inputs should be small in relation tho the
corresponding main effects. This result indicates a possible
problem with the part of MOSCOW'S algorithm which accounts for
the influence of engineer assets on the attrition process.
This indication is reinforced by the observation, from Table
4, that the four inputs which specify both the number of
engineer units and their capabilities relative to each other
produce significant main effects.
26 In fact, with the exception of negation, the results
are identical for all model outputs to four decimal places.
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Another area of difficulty is MOSCOW'S sensitivity to
changes in the number of Red command and control errors
produced by Blue electronic warfare. Not only does the
Defense scenario exhibit extreme sensitivity to this input,
but the observed relationship between an increase in Red
command and control errors appears to result in increased Blue
force requirements. This clearly violates the intuition that
those factors which are a detriment to Red's combat capability
should be of benefit to Blue. Additionally, if the observed
results are correct, then the reported increase in Blue
standing and replacement unit requirements should translate
into an increase in the total numbers of Blue forces and,
therefore, a reduction in the force ratio (R:B). But this is
contrary to the observation which shows a large increase in
force ratio. Since no obvious errors can be found in either
the programming of the factorial experiment or in data
analysis, the possibility of an inconsistency involving this
input within MOSCOW clearly exist.
Lastly, although MOSCOW may appear sensitive to the number
of vehicles found in both Red and Blue units, this is not the
case. A simple example which makes this point clear is to
consider the Attack scenario. Blue units in this scenario
consist of 369 vehicles and MOSCOW computes a standing force
requirement of 11.37 Blue units. This translates to an
initial need for 4196 Blue combat vehicles. If the size of
a Blue unit is increased by 10%, to 406 vehicles, the main
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effect of this change, as reported in Table 3, will be a
decrease in the number of standing Blue units required by 1.56
units. The total number of Blue vehicles required with larger
Blue units is:
(406 veh/unit) x (11.37 units - 1.56 units) = 3983 veh
This represents a decreased requirement for Blue combat
vehicles of only 5%. Thus a 10% increase in the size of blue
units results in only a 5% reduction in the total number of
Blue combat systems, demonstrating that this change of model
input meets the criteria of producing a small change in
output. Similar results hold for changes in the number of
vehicles assigned to Red units. The remaining inputs which
produce significant main effects for at least one output do
appear to have obvious explanations. The appropriateness of
model sensitivity to changes in these inputs is a subject for
further study.
B. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF MAIN EFFECTS
Experience holds much information about how the relative
capabilities of combat forces will change under the pressure
of improving technology. Historically, this pressure has
developed continuous improvements in weapon systems. Most
often, these improvements are seen as increases in weapons
performance: more accurate guns of greater lethality, capable
34
of firing at longer ranges, better armor to meet the threat
of better weapons, greater mobility under conditions of
adverse terrain and weather, more responsive logistical
support, and a general improvement in command, control, and
communications capabilities. In every case "better" weapon
systems are seen to translate into "more capable" forces.
The clear assumption underlying this reasoning is that an
incremental technological improvement of a weapon results in
an incremental increase of a combat unit's overall capability.
Because this idea has great historical appeal and many of
MOSCOW'S inputs are the direct expression of weapon system
characteristics, a reasonable expectation of model performance
is that the main effect of a small improvement in Red weapons
capabilities will require an increase in the number of Blue
units if the definition of victory remains constant. The
converse should be true if Blue has the benefit of improved
technology. In terms of the expected changes in model outputs
examined as the result of factorial experiments, the increase
of a Red force attribute should logically produce an increase
in the number of standing and replacement Blue units, a
decrease in the numerical ratio of total forces (R:B), and an
increase in the numbers of the Attack and Defend cycles which
Blue must accomplish to achieve victory. The opposite changes
should occur if Blue receives the benefit of improved
technology. Similar reasoning can also be applied to explain
the changes in output that should logically be expected from
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changes in victory conditions such as the depth of Red
penetration when Blue is defending or the amount of attrition
to be inflicted on Red by Blue attacks.
The expectations about the influence a small change in
input will have on model output can be compared to the input's
observed main effects as computed from the results of a
factorial experiment. If the directions of the observed
changes agree with intuition, there is no reason to reject the
notion that the model appears to be performing according to
expectation. If, on the other hand, changes in input produce
unexpected changes in output, then two possibilities exist.
First, the input's main effect may be dominated by
interactions with other inputs. This is the situation
discussed earlier where the existence of large interactions
indicates strong dependency between interacting inputs with
the result that little importance can be associated with the
computed main effect. The second case is that, if the main
effect dominates, the model produces results which are
contrary to expectation.
The only requirement for making use of this method is that
some rule must be used to decide how large a given interaction
must be before the associated main effects become unimportant.
For the purpose of this analysis, main effects are considered
inconsequential if a interaction term exists which has a
magnitude which is equal to or greater than one half the
magnitude of the main effect. The relative importance of any
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main effect can be decided by comparing the magnitude of the
main effect to the magnitude of the magnitude of the input's
largest interaction term. With this criterion, the main
effects computed from the results of factorial experiments can
be examined to discover those areas where model performance
may not agree with intuition. Table 5 contains the main
effects computed for the same Blue force inputs in both the
Attack and Defend scenarios. A reasonable expectation of the
effects of a small increase of the first input (# Blue
Vehicles / Blue Unit) is that such units will be slightly more
capable, hence the number of units needed as standing and
replacement forces should decrease along with the number of
attack and defend cycles, while the numerical ratio of forces
(R:B) should increase. This expected result is identical with
observation. Furthermore, all main effects can be shown to
dominate their corresponding interactions.
The last four inputs of Table 5 represent cases where the
expected influence of small increases is a reduction in Blue
unit capability. Thus, the requirements for standing and
replacement units along with the numbers of attack and defend
cycles should increase, whereas the numerical ratio of forces
should decrease. Comparing this expected result with the
observation reveals numerous discrepancies. In Table 5, for
example, the main effects observed for the last input appear
to completely contradict expectation. However, in each case
where an unexpected result occurs, the observed main effect
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TABLE 5




# BLUE VEH/BLUE UNIT









ERROR BY ENEMY EW
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scenario Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
-1.561 -.309 .151 -.885 -.246 -.582 -.130 .292 -.034 -.345
.820 .065 - .009 .594 .001 .072 .006 -.006 .025 .021
-.459 -.024 - .022 -.277 -.056 -.157 -.036 .186 -.002 -.101
.692 .047 .016 .506 -.006 .183 .040 -.203 .015 .104
.146 .000 .005 .061 .002 .109 .005 -.020 .003 .027
.606 .006 .012 .124 .047 .184 .011 -.049 .001 .042
-.076 -.005 .006 -.032 -.022 -.029 -.005 .021 -.002 -.017
1.137 .113 .161 .607 .201 .033 .065 .331 .019 .192
can be shown to be dominated by interactions. The general
result of applying this method to many inputs suggests there
is no evidence to reject the hypothesis that MOSCOW produces
results which meet with expectations. A complete listing of
all main effects as calculated from the results of all
factorial experiments is in Appendix K.
The remaining two inputs, Desired Blue Attacking Force
Ratio and Percentage of Blue Firers Using Direct Fire are
examples of inputs which do not lend themselves to this type
of analysis since no clear intuition exist about the behavior
of these inputs. However, all the main effects for the first
of these inputs are dominate and consistent with the
hypothesis that an increase in attacking force ratio is not
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favorable for Blue. For the last input, all main effects
except for the R:B force ratio in the Attack scenario are
dominate. This suggest that increasing the numbers of direct
fire weapons is favorable for Blue. If the objective of
analysis was to explore whether or not MOSCOW was producing
results which are consistent with other models, these types
of comparisons may be of value.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
As seen in the previous section, this analysis has
identified only two areas where obvious problems appear to
exist within MOSCOW'S algorithms. The first problem involves
the unexpected model sensitivity to changes in engineer
attributes. The second problem is the unexplained sensitivity
to the amount of command and control errors induced by enemy
electronic warfare. Where intuition exists, changes in other
inputs appear to influence the model in a manner that agrees
with expectations.
With the above deficiencies corrected, there is no
evidence showing that MOSCOW could not be calibrated to agree
with the results of a higher resolution model, such as Vector-
In-Commander. MOSCOW could then explore scenarios which
result from small percentage changes of inputs. This would
be the case as long as the proportion of direct and indirect
fire weapons remains relatively constant.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The assumption that the proportions of direct and indirect
fire combatants will remain constant for the duration of
combat represents MOSCOW'S fundamentally limiting assumption.
The exact scope of this limitation, stemming from the model's
underlying square law formulation, is unknown. Future
research should evaluate this limitation in comparison with
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other formulations, such as that proposed by Helmbold [Ref.
3]. This investigation may discover an attrition methodology
which proves better able to handle a wider variety of
situations, yet does not increase the model's complexity or
number of inputs by a significant amount. Pursuing the
answers to these questions will determine which method is the
"best" to use as a basis for the attrition calculations within
MOSCOW.
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN MOSCOW
Currently, MOSCOW'S output screens are restricted to a
width of 80 columns. A consequence of this restriction and
the large amount of information contained in MOSCOW'S output
is that many nonstandard abbreviations are used to make output




































Maneuver Unit — Combat Unit
Maneuver Unit Equivalent per Day
Standing Forces plus Replacements
Maneuver Units — Combat Units
Other supplies requirement
(food, water, etc.)
Maximum rate of Personnel





RED Red Units — Enemy Forces
REPL Replacements (Soldiers who
take the place of casualties)
#S VEH Number of Supply Vehicles
# HQs Number of Headquarters Elements
Required for Combat Operations
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APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTION OF MODEL INPUTS
The inputs used in describing land combats scenarios in
MOSCOW belong to one of six general categories. This group-
ing is described in section 4.3.5, A New Approach for the
Design and Evaluation of Land Defense Concepts . RAND Corp
report R-3643-A, Philip J. Romero.
A. TERRAIN
MOSCOW requires that the user provide some process which
quantifies the traf ficability, defense strength, and target
availability within the zone. These values are then averaged
across the zone to represent a uniform characterization of a
scenario's terrain.
B. LIMITS FOR BLUE
These inputs represent the resource constraints for the
Blue (friendly) force expressed in terms of total maneuver
units available, personnel casualties sustainable,
replacements of personnel and equipment available (total and
daily rate)
,
and supplies. These values are only used for
comparisons against resource requirements.
C. RED THREAT AND ZONE GEOGRAPHY
These inputs describe the size of the Red (enemy) force
and the rectangular dimensions of the geographic zone the
campaign is fought. This geographic description also includes
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the average dimensions and number of choke points which limit
Red operations and the number of engineer units which support
Red's tactical/operational plan.
D. SUCCESS CRITERIA AND OPERATIONAL-LEVEL POLICY FOR BLUE
These inputs define the Blue force tactical objective
which is the number of Red units which will be allowed to
survive. Additional inputs define the deployment of Blue
forces in the zone of operations, the amount of supporting
engineer units, aggressiveness, and linearity of combat
operations.
E. LIMITS FOR BLUE
These inputs specify an upper bound on the resources which
Blue can use during the battle. They do not enter into
MOSCOW'S attrition calculation, but are used to compare model
outputs with user defined maximum resource limit. As such,
these inputs are set to arbitrary levels.
F. MANEUVER UNIT DESCRIPTION
This class of input broadly defines the combat
characteristics of Red and Blue forces. As such, it contains
specifications which describe both unit capabilities and
aggregate vehicle characteristics.
G. SUPPORTING AIR, ARTILLERY, AND ENGINEER CAPABILITIES
These define the quantity of air support available to both
sides. This definition includes the quantity of aircraft
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(fixed wing and helo) which supports each side, how these
assets are allocated between close air support and air
interdiction missions, their lethality, and a rough measure
of the attrition effects of air defenses. Supporting engineer
assets are described by scaling coefficients which quantify
Blue engineers' ability to delay Red and Red engineers'
ability to enhance Red mobility. Artillery inputs are not
useful and are omitted from these input sets.
H. LISTING OF SPECIFIC INPUTS
This paper uses the unclassified inputs developed by TRAC-
FLVN as a starting point for experimental investigation into
the sensitivity of MOSCOW to selected inputs. The methodology
used to generate these inputs and specific details of the
scenarios represented are in draft technical report, A
Methodology for Estimation MOSCOW Inputs , James C. Hoffman,
1988. Broadly speaking, these inputs attempt to demonstrate
a method of generating suitable model inputs which represent
the attack, using airland battle doctrine, of a U.S. Corps to
destroy the lead echelon of an opposing Combined Arms Army
employing Soviet type equipment. The same methodology is also
used to produce inputs representing the defense of this Corps
against a Combined Arms Army's deliberate attack. Both
scenarios occur on the same type of terrain in NORTHAG.
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1. Attack Scenario Inputs
TERRAIN FEATURES IN ZONE (2 screens)
MOVEMENT DEFENSE TARGET FRACTION




Clear Flat 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.34
Mixed Flat 0.86 1.05 0.83 0.11
Forest Flat 0.54 1.27 0.52 0.13
Urban (N/A) 0.64 2.90 0.42 0.09
Clear Rolling 0.88 1.05 1.00 0.17
Mixed Rolling 0.78 1.09 0.67 0.02
Forest Rolling 0.64 1.31 0.52 0.09
Clear Hills 0.83 1.13 0.94 0.01
Mixed Hills 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Forest Hills 0.66 1.38 0.46 0.01
Clear Broken 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mixed Broken 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Forest Broken 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Clr/Mixd Marsh 0.17 1.03 0.83 0.03
Jungle Marsh 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Clear Mountains 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mixed Mountains 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Desert Flat/Rolling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Desert Hills/Mtns 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arctic Flat/Rolling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arctic Hills/Mtns 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tropical Flat/Rolling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tropical Hills/Mtns 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
47








# RED MVR 4.00
# FRNT LN DIVS 2.00
# RED HQs 1.00
# RED ENG UNITS 4.33
% RMVRS-ATK 0.86





# areas where traffic is confined
Average choke area width (km)
Average choke area depth (km)
hrs/day usable for operations
days
# Red maneuver units (rmvrs)
# rmvrs in front line
# Red Headquarters (HQs)
# Red engineer units
% rmvrs assigned atk mission
Average dist between rmvrs (km)
Dist toward enemy/tot dist moved
Dist toward enemy/tot dist moved
(+1.0=forw; -1.0=away; 0=static)
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50.000 km Red allowed to penetrate zone
1.340 # rmvrs allowed to survive
25.000 km max pen before must eng Red
1.000 campaign-days added by Blue ops
0.000 km to border
50.000 km to border
0.100 % Blue atks using linear ops










HQ RAD I US -KM
# ENG UNITS AVAIL
0.800 Dist toward enemy/tot dist moved
0.800 Dist toward enemy/tot dist moved
(+1.0=forw; -1.0=away; 0=static)
0.800 % rmvrs to be killed by atk mvrs
0.200 % rmvrs to be killed by def mvrs
4.000 # Blue HQs in zone
4.000 # mvrs controllable by Blue HQs
50.000 Max dist an HQ can control an mvr
12.000 # Blue engineer units in zone
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LIMITS OF BLUE FORCES AND RESOURCES FOR ZONE (2 screens)
CATEGORY RESOURCE AVAIL.
TOTAL MVR INITIAL 21.80 mvrs
AVAILABLE
MAXIMUM TOT CASLTY 250000 pers
CASUALTIES AVG CASLTY/DAY 5000.0 pers/day
REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL 200000 pers
STOCKS VEHICLES 12000 veh
AVAILABLE AMMO (TONS) 7.0E+05 tons
POL (TONS) 5.0E+06 tons
OTHER (TONS) 1.0E+05 tons
LIFT (TONS) 1.5E+06 tons
DAILY PERSONNEL 4000.0 pers/day
REPLACEMENTS VEHICLES 400.0 veh/day
AVAILABLE AMMO (TONS) 2.0E+04 tons/day
POL (TONS) 4.0E+05 tons/day
OTHER (TONS) 4.0E+03 tons/day
LIFT (TONS) 1.1E+04 tons/day
SUPPLY & HQs SUPP. VEHS 100000 # vehs
AVAILABLE
TOLERANCE LEVEL: 110% Reqd/avail
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MANEUVER UNIT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATIONAL POLICY (7 screens)
Red Blue












369.000 # vehicles per maneuver unit
0.750 % of engagement
0.750 % of engagement
NA %time not moving or fighting













TAC STA PD-ATK 1.000
TAC STA PD-DEF 50.000
DIS/TAC MV-ATK 200.000
DIS/TAC MV-DEF 2500.000




NA % vehicles that breakdown per day
1.460 gals/km
20.000 minutes to change formation type
0.500 % of mvmt time in adm. formation
10.000 minutes stationary when attacking
25.000 minutes stationary when defending
400.000 meters moved per dash in attack
750.000 meters moved per dash on defense




















































































































% firing veh in
























sta tgt @min rng
,
mov tgt @min rng
,
sta tgt @min rng
, mov tgt @min rng
P(h/rd) at max rng
e kill given hit
given veh kill
P(hit/rnd) for IF
IF rnds/min while statnry
IF rnds/min while moving
DF rnds/min while statnry













% veh firing in DF mode
% personnel acting as dismtd
max dis betw veh as % of avg
km
x Friendly lethal ity
x Friendly lethality

















0.560 x hardness assumed in enemy P(k)
0.370 x hardness assumed in enemy P(k)
0.250 % veh concealed from enemy
0.400 % veh concealed from enemy
0.300 % pers attr/day for unit to break







MISC VULN MU-A 1.000
MISC VULN MU-D 1.000
C3IEW
TECH/ORG










BASIC LOAD & LOGISTICS
15.000 km
10.000 km
0.170 % of max preparations
100.000 min dist betw veh--m
0.800 x Enemy lethality
0.500 x Enemy lethality
50.000 sees, reqd to acq stationary tgt
2.000 # of tgt's shots to acq sta tgt
0.050 min % errors in C-3 system
1.000 daily reduc. in C-3 err from
0.500 max % errors in C-3 system
0.250 min % errors in Intel system
1.500 x Blue/red C-3 err due to EW
NA Prep&recov time mult of atk time























SUPP VEH MOVEF NA
CAP/SUPP VEH NA
CAP DEGRDN/KM NA
6.800 passengers and crew per veh
41.000 rounds per veh
265.000 gals POL per veh
680.000 lbs. other resources per veh




89.000 # non cbt casualties recov/day
10.000 # veh losses recoverable/day
0.740 Cbt cas recov / non cbt cas recov
0.500 % veh loss repl . by next engmt
0.500 % veh loss repl. by next engmt
0.500 km from def engmt to supply pt
5.000 km from atk engmt to supply pt
0.250 % of time spent resting
0.800 % of losses repairable by mvr
0.000 % of losses repairable by theater
0.120 % of reprbl losses reprd by mvr
976.200 tons supplies loaded/hr
150.000 km/day that a supply veh can move
10.000 tons capacity per supply veh
0.000 tons cap degrdn per km total dist
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FIRE, AIR AND ENGINEER SUPPORT ALLOCATION (5 screens)
Red Blue












250.000 initial CAS aircraft
3.000 sorties/day
0.100 Attrition rate per sortie
1.480 tons ordnance per sortie
1.480 # vehicles hit per ton of
0.210 Prob. vehicle killed given hit










0.000 tons ammo fired per day per HQ
0.000 veh hits per ton ammo fired
0.000 Prob. vehicle killed given hit
0.000 tons enemy HQ fire suppressed/ton
0.000 % of HQs supporting attk mvrs




NA 0.400 Rmvr-days delay/Blue eng-unit-day











50.000 initial AI aircraft
3.000 sorties/day
0.100 Attrition rate per sortie
8.000 tons ordnance per sortie
0.130 0.130 # vehicles hit per ton of ord







0.130 target hits/ton of ordnance
1.000 Prob. target killed given hit
10.000 mins. mvr delay per target killed
AI DISRUPTION MISSION
TECH/ORG
C3 ERR/TON 0.005 0.005 Incr. in mvr C3 error/ton ord
AI COUNTER HQ MISSION
TECH/ORG
TONS SUPPD/T: 0.000 0.000 tons enemy HQ fire suppressed/ton
AI SUPPLY MISSION
TECH/ORG
S VEH HITS/TON 0.250
S VEH KILS/H 1.000
VEH REIN HITS/T NA
VEH REINF K/H NA
NA Supply veh hits per ton ordnance
NA Prob. supply veh killed given hit
0.250 Reinforcement veh hits/ton ord







1.000 0.330 % AI
0.000 0.330 % AI
0.000 0.330 % AI
0.000 0.000 % AI
sorti assigned attrition msn
sorti assigned delay mission
sorti assigned disrpt msn
sorti assigned counterHQ msn
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2 . Defense Scenario Inputs

































































































































































# RED MVR 4.000
# FRNT LN DIVS 2.000
# RED HQs 1.000
# RED ENG UNITS 15.000
% RMVRS-ATK 0.950
RED DIV SEPRTN 190.000
RMVR AGGRSV-ATK 0.500
RMVR AGGRSV-DEF -0.100
ZONE GEOGRAPHY AND FORCE SIZE
km
km
# areas where traffic is confined
Average choke area width (km)
Average choke area depth (km)
hrs/day usable for operations
days
# Red maneuver units (rmvrs)
# rmvrs in front line
# Red Headquarters (HQs)
# Red engineer units
% rmvrs assigned atk mission
Average dist between rmvrs (km)
Dist to enemy/total dist moved
Dist to enemy/total dist moved
(+1.0=forw; -1.0=away; 0=static)
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250.000 km Red allowed to penetrate zone
1.230 # rmvrs allowed to survive
50.000 km max pen before must eng Red
1.000 campaign-days added by Blue ops
0.000 km to border
200.000 km to border
0.100 % Blue atks using linear ops











# ENG UNITS AVAIL
0.100 Dist to enemy/total dist moved
0.200 Dist to enemy/total dist moved
(+1.0=forw; -1.0=away; 0=static)
0.250 % rmvrs to be killed by atk mvrs
0.750 % rmvrs to be killed by def mvrs
1.000 # Blue HQs in zone
4.000 # mvrs controllable by Blue HQs
100.000 Max dist an HQ can control an mvr
12.000 # Blue engineer units in zone
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LIMITS OF BLUE FORCES AND RESOURCES FOR ZONE (2 screens)
CATEGORY RESOURCE AVAIL.
TOTAL MVR INITIAL 21.80 mvrs
AVAILABLE
MAXIMUM TOT CASLTY 250000 pers
CASUALTIES AVG CASLTY/DAY 5000.0 pers/day
REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL 200000 pers
STOCKS VEHICLES 12000 veh
AVAILABLE AMMO (TONS) 7.0E+05 tons
POL (TONS) 5.0E+06 tons
OTHER (TONS) l.OE+05 tons
LIFT (TONS) 1.5E+06 tons
DAILY PERSONNEL 4000.0 pers/day
REPLACEMENTS VEHICLES 400.0 veh/day
AVAILABLE AMMO (TONS) 2.0E+04 tons/day
POL (TONS) 4.0E+05 tons/day
OTHER (TONS) 4.0E+03 tons/day
LIFT (TONS) 1.1E+04 tons/day
SUPPLY & HQs SUPP. VEHS 100000 # vehs
AVAILABLE
TOLERANCE LEVEL: 110% Reqd/av
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MANEUVER UNIT DESCRIPTION AND OPERATIONAL POLICY (7 screens)
Red Blue
SIZE OF MANEUVER UNIT (MVR)




















TAC STA PD-ATK 1.000
TAC STA PD-DEF 50.000
DIS/TAC MV-ATK 200.000
DIS/TAC MV-DEF 2500.000





MAX IF RATE-S 0.280
MAX IF RATE-M 0.000
MAX DF RATE-S 2.300
MAX DF RATE-M 2.300
IF RANGE-MAX 18.300
IF RANGE-MIN 1.000
DF RANGE -MAX 0.653
0.500 % of engagement
0.500 % of engagement
NA %time not moving or fighting






NA % vehicles that breakdown per day
1.460 gals/km
120.000 minutes to change formation type
0.500 % of mvmt time in adm. formation
10.000 minutes stationary when attacking
25.000 minutes stationary when defending
400.000 meters moved per dash in attack
750.000 meters moved per dash on defense
0.110 IF aggrss as % of DF aggrss.
0.330 % firing veh in adm. formation
0.670 % firing veh in btl . formation
0.340 max rnds/min of IF while statnry
0.000 max rnds/min of IF while moving
3.540 max rnds/min of DF while statnry




















































































P(h/rd): sta DF, sta tgt @min rng
P(h/rd): sta DF, mov tgt 0min rng
P(h/rd): mov DF, sta tgt @min rng
P(h/rd): mov DF, mov tgt @min rng
Degradation of P(h/rd) at max rng
Prob. of vehicle kill given hit
Pr. dismtd kill given veh kill
Degradation of P(hit/rnd) for IF
IF rnds/min while statnry
IF rnds/min while moving
DF rnds/min while statnry




















% veh firing in DF mode
% personnel acting as dismtd
max dis betw veh as %
km
x Friendly lethal ity
x Friendly lethal ity

















0.560 x hardness assumed in enemy P(k)
0.370 x hardness assumed in enemy P(k)
0.250 % veh concealed from enemy
0.600 % veh concealed from enemy
0.300 % pers attr/day for to unit break






















NA 0.330 % of max preparations
50.000 75.000 min dist betw veh--m
1.000 0.250 x Enemy lethality










sees, reqd to acq stationary tgt
# of shots reqd to acq sta tgt
min % errors in C-3 system
daily reduc. in C-3 err by regen
max % errors in C-3 system
min % errors in Intel system
x Blue/red C-3 err due to EW
Prep time as mult of atk time
Prep time as mult of def time






VEH WEIGHT NA 34.700
PERS WEIGHT NA 140.000
AMMO WEIGHT 59.000 59.000
POL WEIGHT NA 7.200
PERS REGEN/DAY NA 89.000
VEH REGEN/DAY 20.000 110.000
CAS REGEN COEF NA 0.580
POLICY & NORMS
%REPL/ATK CYC 0.100 0.200
%REPL/DEF CYC 0.100 0.200
DIS-EXCHPT-DEF NA 0.500
DIS-EXCHPT-ATK NA 5.000
% REST NA 0.250
%REPRBL LOSS-M NA 0.800
%REPRBL LOSS-T NA 0.000
% REPRD-M NA 0.460
LOAD RATE NA 976.200
SUPP VEH MOVEF NA 200.000
CAP/SUPP VEH NA 10.000
CAP DEGRDN/KM NA 0.000
passengers and crew per veh
rounds per veh
gals POL per veh
lbs. other resources per veh




# non cbt casualties recov/day
# veh losses recoverable/day
Cbt cas recov / non cbt cas recov
% veh loss repl . by next engmt
% veh loss repl. by next engmt
km from def engmt to supply pt
km from atk engmt to supply pt
% of time spent resting
% of losses repairable by mvr
% of losses repairable by theater
% of reprbl losses reprd by mvr
tons supplies loaded/hr
km/day that a supply veh can move
tons capacity per supply veh
tons cap degrdn per km total dist
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FIRE, AIR AND ENGINEER SUPPORT ALLOCATION (5 screens)
Red Blue










250.000 initial CAS aircraft
3.000 sorties/day
0.100 Attrition rate per sortie
1.480 tons ordnance per sortie
1.480 # vehicles hit per ton of ord
0.210 Prob. vehicle killed given hit




























0.000 tons ammo fired per day per HQ
0.000 veh hits per ton ammo fired
0.000 Prob. vehicle killed given hit
0.000 tons enemy HQ fire suppressed/ton
0.000 % of HQs supporting attk mvrs
0.000 %of HQs in counterfire agnst HQs
0.310 Rmvr-days delay/Blue eng-unit-day
NA Rmvr-days accel/Red eng-unit-day
50.000 initial AI aircraft
3.000 sorties/day
0.150 Attrition rate per sortie
8.000 tons ordnance per sortie
0.130 # vehicles hit per ton of













AI COUNTER HQ MISSION
TECH/ORG
TONS SUPPD/T: 0.000
0.130 target hits/ton of ordnance
1.000 Prob. target killed given hit
10.000 mins. mvr delay per target killed
0.005 Incr. in mvr C3 error/ton ord
0.000 tons enemy HQ fire suppressed/ton
AI SUPPLY MISSION
TECH/ORG
S VEH HITS/TON 0.250
S VEH KILS/H 1.000
VEH REIN HITS/T NA
VEH REINF K/H NA
NA Supply veh hits per ton ordnance
NA Prob. supply veh killed given hit
0.250 Reinforcement veh hits/ton ord







0.330 0.330 % AI sorti assigned attrition msn
0.330 0.330 % AI sorti assigned delay mission
0.330 0.330 % AI sorti assigned disrpt msn
0.000 0.000 % AI sorti assigned counterHQ msn
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APPENDIX C. DERIVATION OF MODEL METHODOLOGY
Fundamental modeling assumptions for MOSCOW provide a
way to reduce a complicated system of differential equations
to a simple Lanchester "square law" form.
Assume the following system of equations which
describes the attrition interactions between two combatants,






















Xj Y ) (3)





refer to the respective numbers of direct fire
weapons on each side while Xj and Yj correspond to indirect
fire systems. The a
1
are the usual "square law" attrition
coefficients; the b
1
are attrition coefficients given in
the "linear law" case. The dimensionality of these
coefficients is:
a units = S-killed / (R-firer) (unit time)
b units = S-killed / (S-target) (R-firer) (unit time)
Clearly, this formulation accounts for typical tank vs
tank, artillery vs tank, tank vs artillery, and artillery vs
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artillery engagements. MOSCOW reduces this complicated
system of equations to the traditional "square law" case by
assuming the rate at which targets become available to
indirect fire is constant for the duration of battle. This
assumption implies that artillery can only "see" a constant
number of targets independent of the actual size of the
opposing force. This assumption also implies that neither
side approaches annihilation. By defining the following
constant terms, equations 1-4 can be reduced to a









C3 << Yd (t)




/dT = -(a, Y
D
+ b, C, Y,) (5)
dXj/dT = -(a2 Y D + b2 c2 Y,) (6)
dY
D
/dT = -(a3 XD + b3 c3 X,) (7)
dYj/dT = -(a 4 XD + bA c4 X,) (8)
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Summing pairs of equations 5,6 and 7,8:
dtXo+XjJ/dT = -(aj + a 2 )Y D - (b 2 Cj + b 2 c 2 )Yj (9)
d(Y
D
+Yj)/dT = -(a3 + a 4 )X D - (b3 c 3 + b4 c4 )Xj (10)
By assuming the proportion of direct and indirect fire








Then define such constants d
:












Y and Y, = d 4 Y
Substituting into equations 9 and 10 and collecting
terms gives:













dY/dT = -[(a3 + a4)d2 + (b 3 c 3 + b 4 c 4 )d 2 ]Y (12)
These equations are equivalent to the square law case
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APPENDIX D. ATTRITION CALCULATION EQUATIONS
As derived by Hartman [Ref 2, chapter 7, sec 5], the
following equations result from the Lanchesterian square law
formulation of attrition and explicitly determine the
duration of such a battle where:
X and Y are initial force levels
a = coefficient of Y force attrition
b = coefficient of X force attrition
X bp = "Break point" for X force
t b = time required to reach Xb
s = 1/2, exponential parameter
The "break point" is the point, in terms of force size,
that a combatant will chose to disengage from combat so as
not to sustain further losses. A symmetric pair of
equations exist to express these relationships for the Y
force. 27









27 The expressions for the Y force can be obtained by
switching the definitions of variables, substituting Y for X,
a for b, and visa versa.
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Taken together, these equations represent the mechanism
MOSCOW uses to compute either the time required for combat
or the amount of attrition which results from combat. As
solutions of a differential system of equations with
specified initial conditions, the evaluation of these
equations must result in unique solutions. Hence,
transformations which are not identity relations cannot
represent solutions of the original differential system.
Since an change of the exponential parameter, s, to any
value other than 1/2 is not an identity transformation, the
result of such changes will be to fundamentally change the
nature of MOSCOW'S attrition relationship. This means that
the possibility of changing the exponential parameter to
values other than 1/2, as proposed by Romero [Ref. 1, figure
C-15], will result in an attrition relationship which is
different from the "square law" formulation.
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APPENDIX E. AIR-GROUND ATTRITION EQUATIONS
Current descriptions of MOSCOW'S algorithms do not
elaborate on the algorithm used to compute the total number
of aircraft sorties flown in any given campaign. Clues,
however, exist in the code of the model and the inputs
reguired for its computations. Apparently, this algorithm
assumes a constant rate of attrition which decreases the
number of aircraft which are available over time using the
relation:
S, = (1-P) U X
where S
i
= # of sorties available in period u
P = rate of aircraft attrition
X = initial number of aircraft available
The sortie period is a time index defined by the
relation:
u = aTb
where a = sortie rate measured in sorties/day
Tb = length of the battle in days
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By treating this as a continuous process, the total
number of sorties available in a battle of length (t) and
sortie rate (a) is simply:
S = (1-P) r X dr
S = [X /ln(l-P)] [(1-P) U - 1]
since u = aT t
then,
aT.
S = [X_/ln(l-P)] [(1-P) D - 1]
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APPENDIX F. FACTORIAL EXPERIMENT RESPONSE CALCULATION
The following method to calculate the effects produced
by changing the levels of variables in a 2 n factorial
experiment is an adaptation of a tabular approach attributed
to F. Yates 28 . Using this method to compute the main effect
of a single variable reduces to calculating the difference
between the average output of all trials where the variable
is at a high level and the average output when the variable




containing 2 n elements, is used to record
the levels of the variable X, in all trials of an
experiment. Within this vector, the kth element contains 1
or -1. A "1" corresponds to trials with the variable at a
high level; "-1" corresponds to trials at a low level. If
the results of all trials for a single model output, Q^ are
collected in a vector Q^, then these two vectors, X 1 and Q 3 ,










See Davies, Section 7.45, p. 263
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The interaction between two variables is defined as
half of the difference between the average output when the
variables are at similar levels and the average when they
are at dissimilar levels. As demonstrated in Davies , the
previous method of recording the levels of variables in any
trial can be used to compute these interactions by observing











2 (X lk X 2k ) Q jk
k=l
on-1








X 123 Interaction =
2 C^ik *2k X3k ) Q jk
k=l
pn-1
At this point it is easy to observe that, for a given
interaction, multiplying the level codings for each
interacting variable in trial will result in a level coding
29 See Davies, Section 7.441, p. 262
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vector corresponding to the interaction. Yate ' s method
first calculates the level coding vectors for all
interactions and then uses these vectors to compute main
effects and interactions. These vectors are usually
computed in "standard order" where all level coding vectors
corresponding to the main effects and interactions of n-1
variables are combined with the level coding vector of the
X
n
variable to determine the coding vectors of all
interactions with the X
n
variable.
Thus, the order of computation is:
Xj , x
2 ,
x12 , x3 , x 13 , x23 , x123 , x4 , x14 , x24 , x124 , X34' * • *
This algorithm effectively generates all distinct
combinations of main effects and interactions. The total









APPENDIX G. LISTING OF SENSITIVITY EXPERIMENT INPUTS
This appendix list the grouping of variables which
comprise individual experiments in both the attack and
defend scenarios. Code letters are used to correlate
variable description with the results for each experiment.
Input code identifies a particular input during data
analysis
Experiment 1: Single Inputs of Interest
CODE INPUT
A HRS/DAY USABLE
B %RED UNITS ATTACKING
C # RED ENGINEER UNITS
D % BLUE ATTACK OPS LINEAR
E RED PENETRATION LIMIT
F # RED UNITS ALLOWED TO
SURVIVE
G # BLUE ENGINEER UNITS
Experiment 2 : Red Maneuver Unit Description and
Operational Policy
CODE INPUT
A # RED VEHICLES/RED
MANEUVER UNIT
B DESIRED ATTACK FORCE RATIO
C % FIRERS USING DIRECT FIRE
D TARGET ACQUISITION TIME
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(seconds)
E C 3 ERROR (minimum %)
F INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
(minimum %)
G C3 ERRORS DUE TO ENEMY
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Experiment 3 : Blue Maneuver Unit Description and
Operational Policy
CODE INPUT
A # RED VEHICLES/RED
MANEUVER UNIT
B DESIRED ATTACK FORCE RATIO
C % FIRERS USING DIRECT FIRE
D TARGET ACQUISITION TIME
(seconds)
E C3 ERROR (minimum %)
F INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
(minimum %)
G C3 ERRORS DUE TO ENEMY
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Experiment 4: Logistic and Maintenance Attributes of
Interest
CODE INPUT
A BLUE PERSONNEL REGENERATION
(persons/day)
B RED VEHICLE REGENERATION
(veh/day)
C BLUE VEHICLE REGENERATION
(veh/day)
D BLUE CASUALTY REGENERATION
COEFFICIENT
% RED VEHICLE LOSSES REPLACED
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BY NEXT ATTACK CYCLE
F % BLUE VEHICLE LOSSES
REPLACED BY NEXT ATTACK CYCLE
G % RED VEHICLE LOSSES REPLACED
BY NEXT DEFENSE CYCLE
H % BLUE VEHICLE LOSSES
REPLACED BY NEXT DEFENSE
CYCLE
I DISTANCE TO BLUE SUPPLY
EXCHANGE POINT IN DEFENSE
J DISTANCE TO BLUE SUPPLY
EXCHANGE POINT IN ATTACK
Experiment 5: Aggregate Red Weapons Attributes of Interest
CODE INPUT
A ACTUAL RATE OF INDIRECT FIRE
(stationary firer)
B ACTUAL RATE OF DIRECT FIRE
(both stationary and moving)
C ACTUAL MAXIMUM INDIRECT FIRE
RANGE (km)
D ACTUAL MAXIMUM DIRECT FIRE
RANGE (km)
E PROBABILITY OF KILL GIVEN HIT
F PROBABILITY OF INDIRECT FIRE
HIT SCALING FACTOR
G COEFFICIENT OF FRONTAL ARMOR
HARDNESS
H COEFFICIENT OF SIDE ARMOR
HARDNESS
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Experiment 6: Aggregate Blue Weapons Attributes of Interest
CODE INPUT
A ACTUAL RATE OF INDIRECT FIRE
(stationary firer)
B ACTUAL RATE OF DIRECT FIRE
(both stationary and moving)
C ACTUAL MAXIMUM INDIRECT FIRE
RANGE (km)
D ACTUAL MAXIMUM DIRECT FIRE
RANGE (km)
E PROBABILITY OF KILL GIVEN HIT
F PROBABILITY OF INDIRECT FIRE
HIT SCALING FACTOR
G COEFFICIENT OF FRONTAL ARMOR
HARDNESS
H COEFFICIENT OF SIDE ARMOR
HARDNESS



















RED MOBILITY DECREASE PER
BLUE ENGINEER UNIT













AVERAGE VEHICLE SPEED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT
(km/hr)
AVERAGE VEHICLE SPEED IN
BATTLE (km/hr)
% OF VEHICLES WHICH CAN FIRE
IN ADMINISTRATIVE FORMATIONS
% OF VEHICLES WHICH CAN FIRE
IN BATTLE FORMATION
% VEHICLES CONCEALED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE FORMATION














C AVERAGE VEHICLE SPEED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT
(km/hr)
D AVERAGE VEHICLE SPEED IN
BATTLE (km/hr)
E % OF VEHICLES WHICH CAN FIRE
IN ADMINISTRATIVE FORMATIONS
F % OF VEHICLES WHICH CAN FIRE
IN BATTLE FORMATION
G % VEHICLES CONCEALED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE FORMATION
H % VEHICLES CONCEALED IN
BATTLE FORMATION
Experiment 10: Attack/Defend Paired Scenario Inputs
CODE INPUT
A RED UNIT AGGRESSIVENESS IN
ATTACK
B RED UNIT AGGRESSIVENESS
IN DEFENSE
C BLUE UNIT AGGRESSIVENESS
IN ATTACK
D BLUE UNIT AGGRESSIVENESS
IN DEFENSE
E % RED UNITS TO BE KILLED
BY BLUE ATTACKS
F % RED UNITS TO BE KILLED
BY BLUE DEFENSES
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Experiment 11: Red Attack/Defend Paired Maneuver Unit
Description and Operational Policy
CODE INPUT
A % RED KILLED BY EACH BLUE
ATTACK ENGAGEMENT
B % RED KILLED BY EACH BLUE
DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT
C TIME STATIONARY IN ATTACK
D TIME STATIONARY IN DEFENSE
E AVERAGE DISTANCE MOVED
BETWEEN HALTS IN THE ATTACK
F AVERAGE DISTANCE MOVED
BETWEEN HALTS IN THE DEFENSE
Experiment 12: Blue Attack/Defend Paired Maneuver Unit
Description and Operational Policy
CODE INPUT
A % OF ATTACK ENGAGEMENTS ENDED
AT A TIME CHOSEN BY BLUE
B % OF DEFENSE ENGAGEMENTS
ENDED AT A TIME CHOSEN BY
BLUE
C % BLUE KILLED BY EACH RED
ATTACK ENGAGEMENT
D % BLUE KILLED BY EACH RED
DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT
E TIME STATIONARY IN ATTACK
F TIME STATIONARY IN DEFENSE
G AVERAGE DISTANCE MOVED
BETWEEN HALTS IN THE ATTACK
H AVERAGE DISTANCE MOVED
BETWEEN HALTS IN THE DEFENSE
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SEPARATION FROM RED UNITS
THAT BLUE CAN MAINTAIN IN THE
ATTACK (SHADOW DISTANCE)
SEPARATION FROM RED UNITS
THAT BLUE CAN MAINTAIN IN THE
DEFENCE (SHADOW DISTANCE)
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APPENDIX H. ESTIMATING RECALCULATION REQUIREMENTS
A consequence of the simultaneity within MOSCOW is that,
by fixing input parameters and then successively
recalculating the MOSCOW spreadsheet, model outputs converge
to specific values. Although Romero [Ref. 1] proves
MOSCOW'S algorithms will converge, his explanation gives no
information on the path this convergence takes or the points
at which numerical limitations present computational
difficulties . Until this information is provided, model
users face the problem of finding some reasonable way to
estimate the number of recalculations required to move the
point of output convergence of an initial set of input
values to a new point defined by a specific change in these
initial inputs. One way to approach this problem is to
assume that, with no information to the contrary, the number
of recalculations required to obtain convergence for changes
in inputs which result in "small" changes of outputs is less
than or equal to the number of recalculations need to
produce convergence for those changes in inputs which
produce "large" changes in outputs. With this idea, the
30 • • • • •The possibility exist that certain ranges of input
values may not result in convergence as a result of excessive
truncation, overflow, or underflow conditions which result
from the inherent limitation of computers.
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following heuristic approach was used to determine the
number of recalculations required to produce a satisfactory
level of convergence:
1. Double the numbers of Red forces while leaving all
other inputs at a fixed level.
2. Recalculate the model 256 times. (Experience has
shown this will produce convergence to at least 12
decimal places.)
3. Return Red force levels to their original values.
4. Perform 256 successive recalculations of the model,
recording the resulting levels for those outputs of
interest at each recalculation.
5. Assume that model outputs converge to the values
obtained in the final recalculation.
6. Compute the difference between the output levels
observed on each recalculation and those of the last
recalculation.
7. Select as the recalculation requirement the number
of recalculations which will guarantee convergence
to within a desired amount.
For this investigation, the accuracy requirements
defined in Section IV lead to the following calculations:
1. Attack Scenario Convergence Limit
Since a Blue unit in the Attack scenario contains
3 69 combat vehicles, the accuracy requirement, Aatk ,
is:
Aatk = (.5) (1/369)
= 1.355 x 10" 3 Blue Units
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2. Defense Scenario Convergence Limit
Since a Blue unit in the Defense scenario contains




= 4.513 x 10" 4 Blue Units
Performing the above heuristic procedure using the
inputs for the Attack and Defend scenarios in Appendix B and
comparing the resulting levels of convergence for both
"Standing" and "Replacement" Blue unit outputs with the
appropriate accuracy requirement leads to the conclusion
that 21 recalculations achieve desired convergence in the
Attack scenario while 15 suffice in the Defense. Figures 1-
4 show the levels of convergence for these cases. Results
of this procedure also indicate that MOSCOW'S algorithm
converges by oscillating about the limiting value for each
output. While an interesting observation, this
characteristic of convergence may not be true in general.
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Figure 3. Convergence of Defense Scenario, Standing Blue
Units Required.
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Figure 4. Convergence of Defense Scenario, Replacement
Blue Units Required.
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APPENDIX I. FACTORIAL EXPERIMENT MACRO LISTING
The following listings are examples of those
incorporated into the MOSCOW spreadsheet in order to perform
factorial experiments. Two different, but essentially
equivalent programs were used. This was necessary to
overcome the LOTUS 1-2-3, ver 2, macro limitation on the
number of nested loops which can be imbedded within a macro.
This limitation restricts the efficiency of experiments
using nine or more inputs.
Each macro has three elements. The first section
contains variable declarations which specify the changes in
levels of specific inputs. The next section contains a
control section that implements a 2 n factorial design as a
series of nested loops. Recalculation of the spreadsheet is
called by this section. The specific number of
recalculations performed must be declared in the spreadsheet
iteration counter prior to macro execution. Upon completion
of the specified number of iterations for each trial, this
section writes the results to a table which contains
indicators of the levels for all experimental variables
(inputs) and the resulting levels for five model outputs.
One row of the results table corresponds to one trial of the
experiment. A "1" in a column associated with a variable
indicates that the input was at the high level during that
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trial. Zeros indicate inputs at the low level. The last
program section writes the results of each trial to an
output file. Due to memory limitations, results were
written in 128 record blocks. The output files GR0UP1,
GR0UP2 , ..., GR0UP8 are the destinations of these results.
These files must exist prior to macro execution.
1. MACRO listing for 10 variable experiment.
COMPLETE TWO LEVEL FACTORIAL EXPERIMENT OF UP TO 10 FACTORS
CONSTANTS DELTA= 0.10 {The percentage difference of the lower level from the upper level
VAR 1 VAR 2 VAR 3
VARIABLES
RED MISC LETH MU-AT BLUE MISC LETH MU- AT RED MISC LETH MU-DE
Counter CTR1= CTR2= CTR3=
Test value TVL1= 0.80 TVL2= 1.00 TVL3= 0.50
Increment IKC1= -0.08 INC2= -0.10 INC3= -0.05
VAR 4 VAR 5 VAR 6
BLUE MISC LETH MU-DE RED MISC VULN MU- AT BLUE MISC VULN
MU-AT
Counter CTR4= CTR5= CTR6=
Test value TVL4= 1.00 TVL5= 1.00 TVL6= 0.80
Increment 1NC4= -0.10 INC5= -0.10 INC6= -0.08
VAR 7 VAR 8 VAR 9 VAR 10
RED MISC VULN MU-DE BLUE MISC VULN MU-DE DEL/D/ENG ACCEL/ENG
CTR7= CTR8= CTR9= CTR10=
TVL7= 1.00 TVL8= 0.50 TVL9= 0.40 TVL10= 0.25
INC7= -0.10 1NC8= -0.05 INC9= -0.04 INC10= -0.03
MACRO PROGRAM
\J {LET COUNTER, 0XVAR1)
VAR1 {FOR CTR1,0,1,1,VAR2>





VAR5 {FOR CTR5,0 / 1,1,VAR6>
VAR6 {FOR CTR6,0,1,1,VAR7)
VAR7 {FOR CTR7,0,1,1,VAR8)













































































Output table containing levels of variables:
VAR 1
LEVELS of VARIABLES
VAR 2 VAR 3 VAR 4 VAR 5 VAR 6 VAR 7 VAR 8 VAR 9 VAR 10000000000
Output table containing levels of measures of effectiveness for each trial:
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 4 MOE 5
STANDING REPL RED:BLUE GRND ATK CYCLES DEF CYCLES
11.3706413 1.3070730 1.6099078 6.0713466 2.0052472
2. MACRO listing for eight variable experiment
COMPLETE TWO LEVEL FACTORIAL EXPERIMENT OF UP TO 8 FACTORS









VAR 2 VAR 3
ACT IF RATE-S
CTR2= CTR3=
TVL2= 0.00 TVL3= 0.340
INC2= 0.00 INC3= 0.00
VAR 4 VAR 5 VAR 6










































VAR10 (FOR CTR10, 0,1,1, COMPUTE)
COUNTER 0.00
COMPUTE (LET ,TVL1+INC1*CTR1;V
































VAR 1 VAR 2 VAR 3 VAR 4 VAR 5 VAR 6 VAR 7 VAR 8 VAR 9 VAR 100000000000
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
MOE 1 MOE 2 MOE 3 MOE 4 MOE 5
STANDING REPL RED:BLUE GRND ATK CYCLES DEF CYCLES
3.3243906 0.6491045 3.3061550 0.1920200 1.9240636
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APPENDIX J. INPUT SENSITIVITY PROGRAM LISTING
This APL program computes the main effects and levels of
interaction for a sensitivity experiment using the LOTUS
macro program in Appendix I. Lotus format output files must
be merged and converted into a STATGRAPHICS file using the
file conversion facilities within version 6.4. This program
will read these files and interactively compute a results
file which contains all resulting main effects and levels of
interaction. Once results for a given experiment have been
calculated, the results are saved for further analysis. The
user is given the option of replaying results at user
selected levels of significance or requesting a rank
ordering of the magnitudes of all interactions and main
effects. This ordering can be used to determine the
dominance of main effects vice corresponding interactions.
VFINT[D3V
[ ] FINT ; F : N : R : FAC : K ; COUNT : M : T : TEMP : OLD : OLDINDEX :TEMPINDEX : J : MOE : I : VARI : I NX : SOP.
m LOUT: 'REVIEW .PREVIOUSLY COMPUTED INTERACTIONS ? (Y/N)' o ANS«-D
[2] -»( ' Y' =1TANS) C L13
[31 'COMPUTE INTERACTIONS OF NEW DATA FILE ? (Y/N)' O ANS«-0
[43 -»C 'N' =lTANS)pO a If 'N'. then abort program
[5) 'INPUT NAME OF NEW "asf" DATA FILE' © ANS«-0
[6] ANS DFTIE 90
[7] F«-90
[83 'INPUT THE NUMBER OF VARIABLES* O N«-0
[93 'INPUT THE NUMBER OF MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS' © R«-D
[103 'INPUT THE FACTOR OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR RESULTS' © FAC«-D
[113
[12 3 D«-' CREATE FILES' © "
[13 3 'INDEX' DFCREATE 98












[25? M«-CDFSIZE 99)12 3-1
[26: T«-OFREAD(F.K)
[27; TEMP«-(T=Oi» ( "lxTi sConvert data to string of l's and "l's
[28: C-TEMP DFAPPEND 99 oSave result in EFFECTS file
129 3
[30 3 «SET INDEX
1313 T£MPINDEX«-1TVARI
[32: P«-TEMPINDEX DFAPPEND 96
[33: 0*-' ' .TEMPINDEX
[ 34 3





-»(COUNT = l)pLl nFirst variable has no interactions
[39:






[46 3 C«-(OLD*TEMP)CFAPPEND 9?
[47 3 P«-(CLDINDEX.TEKFINDEX)DFAPPEND 96




[513 fiCHECK FOR MORE VARIABILES
[52 3 -»(COUNT<N)pLl
[533 C«-(CFSIZE 98 ) [ 3 1 ( DFSIZE 99U33
[54 3 D«-' ' O "TOTAL FILE STORAGE REQUIRED: '.(*C),' bytes'
[553
[56 3 fi READ THE MOE RESULTS DATA VECTORS
[57 3





[633 MOE»(R. (2«N) )p0




[68 3 e COMPUTE THE VALUE OF MAIN EFFECTS ANC INTERACTIONS FOR ALL MOE '
S
[69 3 «-• O 'COMPUTING MAIN EFFECTS AND INERACTIONS '
[703 I«-l
[713 INTR«-( ( (2«N)-13 .R)p0
[723 INDEX«-( ( (2«N)-1) ,10)p' '




[773 INDEX[I ; 3«-INX. ( 10-SORTVEC[I :13 )p' '
[783
[793 J«-l

































































SORT RESUTING INTERACTION: MAIN EFFECTS. TWO-KAY. THREE-WAY. ETC.
INTR: : ]«-INTR[ 4SORTVEC: ]
INDEXL : ]«-INDEX[*SORTVtw': 3
D- ' ' O 'EFFECTS COMPUTED. MEMORY REQUIRED:
NAME«-ANS
( 1C284 4 16-0KA' bvtes
'
o SAVE COMPUTED LEVELS OF INTERACTION FOR LATER ANALYSIS
•• O -SAVE RESULTS" (Y/N> ' © ANS«-0
-.( • Y' *ltANS)oSKIP
(
'E' . NAME )DFCREATE 80
(
'I' .NAME3 0FCREATE 81
] C«-N DFAPPEND 80
] C«-R DFAPPEND 80
] C«-INTR DFAPPEND 80
] C«-(R.l)pMOE[ ;1]DFAPPEND 80
] O-INDEX DFAPPEND 81
1
] DFUNTIE 80 81
]
] 'INDEX' DFERASE 98
] 'EFFECTS' DFERASE 99
]
] SKIP:0«-'' O 'RESULTS FOLLOW'
]
3 P COMPUTE LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR EACH MOE AT DESIRED FACTOR
]





] L7 : ' ' © ' ' © ' '
] ' SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS FOR MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS '.*I
3 ' [Level of significance = I ' . ( »SIG[ 1
3
j . ' I
'
3




















'NEW LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE 7 (Y/N) ' © ANS«-D






] L10: ' ' © 'ENTER NEW LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE'
3 FAC«-0
3 -»L6




[148] L13: 'ENTER NAME OF RESULTS FILE (Do not include "ssf" extension)' o NAME«-C
[149] ( 'E' .NAME)GFTIE 80
[1503 CI' .NAMEJDFTIE 81
1151]
1152 3 A DECODE THE NUMBER OF VARIABLES AND MOE IN THESE DATA FILES
[153]
[154 ] N«-DFREAD 80 1
[155] R«-DFREAD 80 2
[1563 INTR«-0FREAD 80 3
[157] BL«-DFREAD 80 4
[158] INDEX«-0FREAD 81 1
[159] DFUNTIE 80 81
[160] 'FILES READ'
[1611
[162] 'RANK ORDER OF MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS' (Y/N)' O ANS«-n
[163] *( • Y' =lTANS)pL14
[164] -»L10
[165]
[166] L14:' r O '' o 'ENTER DEPTH OF RANKING TO DISPLAY (Integer > 0] ' o LIM«-0
[167] I«-l
[166: L15:J«-1
[169] ' ' o '
'
[170] 'RANK ORDER FOR MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS '.»I
[171] ' ' O '












APPENDIX K. COMPUTED MAIN EFFECTS
The following tables contain the main effects for all
inputs as computed from factorial experiments. Main effects
for those inputs marked with an asterisk were used in
comparisons with a priori predictions of how a small (10
percent) increase in input level should influence model
output. All cases where such expectations do not agree with
observation appear in instances where the main effect term
is dominated by interactions with other inputs.




*# RED ENGINEER UNITS
*%BLUE ATTACK OPS LINEAR
*RED PENETRATION LIMIT
*# RED UNITS SURVIVING
*# BLUE ENGINEER UNITS
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scena rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
1.144 .070 - .107 .502 .313 .358 .004 - .040 • .006 .234
.056 .004 - .001 .041 -.002 -.101 -.015 .074 - .021 -.043
1.286 .018 - .001 .659 .258 .295 .014 - .071 .010 .179
.003 .000 .000 .003 .000 .005 .011 - .061 .000 .003
-1.123 -.019 .001 -.573 -.227 -.463 -.017 .076 - .018 -.276
-.519 -.075 .000 -.260 -.110 -.192 -.035 .019 - .008 -.114
-1.861 -.029 .002 -.950 -.376 -1.616 -.056 .248 - .065 -.965
1.137 .113 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192
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*# RED VEH/RED UNIT
DESIRED ATK FORCE RATIO
%FIRERS-DIRECT FIRE
TARGET ACQUISITION TIME
*C3 ERROR (min X)
INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
C
3 ERROR BY ENEMY EW
10% Level •
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scena rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
1.332 .252 - .264 .651 .300 .237 .095 -.444 .029 .167
.209 .135 - .425 -.111 .261 .065 .059 -.565 .003 .089
.703 .189 - .446 .338 .165 .136 .052 -.434 .022 .022
.061 .001 - .001 .044 .000 .004 .002 -.010 .000 .004
-.023 -.006 .014 -.005 -.012 -.028 -.002 .019 .000 -.029
-.814 -.049 .093 -.528 -.054 -.043 -.016 .113 .005 -.015
.218 .015 - .033 .129 -.011 6.233 1.181 7.244 .342 3.616
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192




# BLUE VEH/BLUE UNIT
DESIRED ATK FORCE RATIO
%FIRERS-DIRECT FIRE
TARGET ACQUISITION TIME
C3 ERROR (min %)
INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
C3 ERROR BY ENEMY EW
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scenario Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
-1.561 -.309 .151 -.885 -.246 -.582 -.130 .292 - .034 -.345
.820 .065 - .009 .594 .001 .072 .006 -.006 .025 .021
-.459 -.024 - .022 -.277 -.056 -.157 .036 .186 - .002 -.101
.692 .047 .016 .506 -.006 .183 .040 -.203 .015 .104
.146 .000 .005 .061 .002 .109 .005 -.020 .003 .027
.606 .006 .012 .124 .047 .184 .011 -.049 .001 .042
-.076 -.005 .006 -.032 -.022 -.029 -.005 .021 - .002 -.017
1.137 .113 .161 .607 .201 .033 .065 .331 .019 .192
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Red Organization for Combat,












Attack Scena rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.447 .059 - .078 .279 .039 .099 .021 -.147 .023 .040
.604 .021 - .015 .292 .138 .188 .004 -.017 .009 .111
.209 .006 • .003 .103 .046 .068 .003 -.017 .003 .040
.230 .061 • .102 .091 .073 .084 .019 -.136 .010 .044
.180 .048 • .079 .076 .052 .007 -.002 .014 .001 .004
.076 .007 .000 .047 .007 .070 .015 -.118 .000 .044
.015 .002 .000 .008 .002 .003 .000 -.001 .000 .002
1.137 .113 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192
Blue Organization for Combat,












Attac k Scenario Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
-.382 - .020 .000 -.263 -.010 -.035 -.003 .000 -.010 -.012
-.128 - .007 .000 -.088 -.003 -.012 -.001 .000 -.003 -.004
-.347 .014 - .027 -.285 .038 -.141 -.027 .152 -.001 -.089
.038 .020 - .036 .005 .022 .068 .008 -.050 -.004 .048
-.109 • .021 .024 -.068 -.010 -.144 -.030 .157 -.003 -.089
-.003 .002 .002 -.002 -.001 -.059 -.015 .051 -.001 -.037
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192
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•INDIRECT FIRE MAX RANGE
•DIRECT FIRE MAX RANGE
*DF PROB KILL GIVEN HIT





Attack Scena rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
.017 .002 - .003 .004 .008 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
.411 .092 - .150 .172 .121 .052 .011 -.071 .011 .022
.022 .003 - .005 .007 .009 .000 .001 -.001 .003 -.003
-.001 .000 .000 -.001 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
.431 .094 - .153 .186 .122 .053 .010 -.069 .011 .022
-.037 -.003 .006 -.010 -.016 .000 .000 -.001 .000 .000
.240 .013 - .003 .171 .000 .037 .009 -.067 .000 .024
.209 .001 .036 .112 .037 .045 .008 -.059 .004 .025
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192




•INDIRECT FIRE MAX RANGE
•DIRECT FIRE MAX RANGE
*DF PROB KILL GIVEN HIT





Attack Scena rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
-.001 .000 - .001 -.002 .001 -.007 -.001 .005 - .002 -.003
-.259 -.012 - .019 -.175 -.010 .026 .070 - .285 - .001 .017
-.002 .000 - .001 -.003 .001 .007 .005 - .014 .002 .002
.000 .000 .000 -.001 .001 .158 .063 - .202 .009 .092
-.298 -.018 - .015 -.201 -.011 .203 .070 - .234 .013 .117
.018 .000 .001 .012 .001 .002 -.004 .011 .001 .000
-.124 -.010 .006 -.088 -.001 .019 -.001 .005 .001 .012
-.633 -.138 .174 -.280 -.170 .106 .009 - .017 .008 .060
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192
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Lethality, Vulnerability, and Mobility Scaling Inputs
Input
MISC LETHALITY (Red atk)
MISC LETHALITY (Blue atk)
MISC LETHALITY (Red def)
MISC LETHALITY (Blue def)
MISC VULN (Red atk)
MISC VULN (Blue atk)
MISC VULN (Red def)
MISC VUNL (Blue def)
*COEF BLUE ENG ABILITY
*COEF RED ENG ABILITY
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scena rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
.727 .129 - .209 .368 .150 .183 .029 -.157 .011 .106
-.111 .001 - .024 -.109 .030 -.003 -.001 .000 -.008 .006
.030 .004 - .005 .020 .001 .003 .000 .000 .002 .000
-.062 .000 - .004 .016 -.061 -.161 -.026 .150 .001 -.104
-.051 .000 - .004 .023 -.060 -.161 -.026 .150 .001 -.104
.033 .004 - .006 .022 .001 .003 .000 .000 .002 .000
-.136 .002 - .029 -.129 .032 -.001 .000 -.003 -.007 .006
.659 .131 - .220 .330 .140 .169 .029 -.155 .011 .097
-1.825 -.021 - .004 -.887 -.414 -1.414 -.037 .150 -.056 -.846
1.078 .002 .022 .542 .226 .208 .002 -.003 .009 .124
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .056 .331 .019 .192






%RED VEH LOSS REPL ATK
X8LUE VEH LOSS REPL ATK
XRED VEH LOSS REPL DEF
XBLUE VEH LOSS REPL DEF
BLUE EXCH PT DIST DEF
•BLUE EXCHPT DIST ATK
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scena rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.009 .001 .000 .006 .001 .019 .004 .000 .002 .010
-.148 -.003 .000 -.009 -.096 -.046 -.002 .000 .000 -.029
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
-.007 -.001
.000 -.006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.041 .004 - .001 .031 -.002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.001 .000 - .001 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.041 .001 .000 .031 -.002 .001 .000 .000 .001 .000
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192
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XRED KILLED BY BLUE ATK
XRED KILLED BY BLUE DEF
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scene rio Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.049 .090 - .128 .396 .110 -.094 -.011 .079 .014 -.036
.010 .068 - .138 -.043 .168 -.063 .015 • .094 .001 .068
.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192




XRED KILLED BY EACH ATK
%RED KILLED BY EACH DEF
TIME STATIONARY IN ATK
TIME STATIONARY IN DEF
DIST BETWEEN HALTS (Atk)
DIST BETWEEN HALTS (Def)
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attack Scenario Defense Sceneirio
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R-.B ATK DEF
-.812 -.067 .040 -.599 .020 -.017 -.002 .011 - .002 -.009
.000 -.003 .005 .000 .000 -.164 -.010 - .007 .001 -.106
-.990 -.044 - .080 -.757 .052 -.238 -.049 .247 - .029 -.123
.254 .020 - .007 .185 -.004 -.008 -.001 .008 .003 -.008
.028 .016 - .028 .030 -.011 -.099 -.019 .110 .001 -.064
-.150 -.019 .013 -.113 .006 -.016 -.002 .006 • .002 -.008
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .332 .065 .331 .019 .192
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%ATK ENGMENT END BY BLUE
XDEF ENGMENT END BY BLUE
XBLUE KILLED BY EACH ATK
X8LUE KILLED BY EACH DEF
TIME STATIONARY IN ATK
TIME STATIONARY IN DEF
DIST BETWEEN HALTS (Atk)
DIST BETWEEN HALTS (Def)
BREAK CONTACT DIST (Atk)
BREAK CONTACT DIST (Def)
10% Level -
(Absolute Value)
Attac k Scenario Defense Scenario
STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF STAND REPL R:B ATK DEF
1.050 .104 -.074 .752 -.005 -.002 -.001 .001 -.002 .000
-.088 -.038 .064 .029 -.091 .156 .012 -.018 -.001 .101
-.029 -.003 .003 -.017 -.004 -.009 .000 -.004 -.004 -.001
-.210 -.085 .138 .060 .210 -.162 -.027 .146 .002 -.105
.030 .007 -.010 .013 .008 .004 .000 -.002 .001 .002
.000 -.001 .002 .002 -.002 .003 .000 -.002 .000 .002
-.004 .000 -.001 -.001 -.002 .003 .000 -.002 .000 .002
.008 .001 -.003 .001 .005 .003 .000 -.002 .000 .002
.223 .012 .001 .171 -.013 .006 .000 -.002 .002 .002
.027 .002 .000 -.008 .027 .023 .002 .000 .000 .015
1.137 .131 .161 .607 .201 .322 .065 .331 .019 .192
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